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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
CHERYL FREDERICKSON,
Plaintiff/Respondent,

Docket No- 890681-CA

-vsKEITH FREDERICKSON,

Priority Classification 14b

Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

COMES

NOW

THE

DEFENDANT/APPELLANT

(hereinafter

"the

husband") and hereby submits the following as his Appellate Brief
in the above-captioned matter:
JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals in
this matter pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-2a3(2)(h) (1953, as amended).
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from the final judgment and order entered
by the trial court herein on or about November 3, 1989 in a
divorce modification proceeding.

No motions pursuant to Rules

50(a), 50(b), 52(b) or 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
were filed in this matter.

The Notice of Appeal was filed with

the lower court in this action on or about November 16, 1989.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The issues presented for review in the above-entitled appeal

action are as follows:

1 - Did
husband's
child

the

petition

support

lower

2 - Did the trial

obtain

failing

to

for

finding

additional

the
his

1988,

the

modification?

for modification

court's

grant

to reduce

to November 9,

court err in basing

petition

upon the

should

in

retroactive

of his petition

the husband's

err

to modify the Decree of Divorce

obligation

date of filing

support

court

that

education

to

its

judgment

regarding

and reduction
the

husband

enhance

his

of

child

could

and

employment

skills?
3 - Did the trial
husband's
support

petition
upon the

should obtain

child

for

support

for

modification

court's

finding

lower

child
figures

court

support

judgment
reduction

the

husband

err in granting

of
could

child
and

the plaintiff

the husband based

in the Decree of

the husband for attorney's

a

upon the

Divorce?

5 - Did the lower court err in awarding plaintiff
against

regarding

of 40 hours per week?

against

set forth

and
that

employment in excess

4 - Did the
judgment

court err in basing its

a judgment

fees?

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
There are no case law authorities or statutory authorities
believed by the husband to be wholly dispositive of the issues on
appeal herein.

The statutory authority which may be dispositive

of some of the issues presented on appeal is Utah Code Annotated,
Section 78-45-7.5, a true and correct copy of which is attached
hereto, designated as "Exhibit A" of the Addendum hereto, and
9

incorporated herein by reference.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE/STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

This is a divorce modification proceeding.

2.

The parties were divorced by a Decree of Divorce entered

in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, on or about September 27, 1985.

A true and

correct copy of the Decree of Divorce is attached as "Exhibit BH
of the Addendum hereto and incorporated herein by reference.
3.

The parties are the parents of three children, namely:

Rachel, born April 22, 1970; Adam, born February 16, 1974; and
Megan,

born

November

7,

19 77.

The

plaintiff/respondent

(hereinafter "the wife") was awarded the permanent care, custody
and control of the minor children, subject to the husband's
reasonable

rights

of

visitation.

(See

Decree

of

Divorce,

paragraph 3)
4.

The husband was ordered to pay the sum of Two Hundred

Fifty Dollars ($250.00) per month, per child, as and for support
for the children for a period of six months after the Decree of
Divorce,

after

which

time

the

support

was

to

increase

automatically to the sum of Three Hundred Dollars ($300.00) per
month, per child, for a period of nine months, after which time
the child support was to increase automatically to the sum of
Three Hundred Fifty Dollars ($350.00) per month, per child, until
the children attained the age of 18 years or graduated from high
school in the normal expected years of their graduations.
Decree

of Divorce,

paragraph 5)

(See

5.

Pursuant to the Decree of Divorce, each party was

awarded a one-half interest in the marital residence.

The wife

was permitted to occupy the residence and had an interest in the
residence of approximately Thirty Thousand Dollars ($30,000.00).
The

husband

was

($30,000.00).
Law and Order
6.

granted

a lien

for Thirty Thousand

(See Finding 6 of Findings
in Re: Petition

for

of Fact,

Dollars

Conclusions

of

Modification)

At the time of the entry of the Decree of Divorce, the

wife was not employed outside the home and had not been employed
outside

the

home

and

earning

an

independent

approximately eight years immediately prior.
Findings
for

of

Fact,

Conclusions

income

for

(See Finding 6 of

of Law and Order

in Re:

Petition

Modification)
7.

At the exact time of the entry of the Decree of Divorce,

the husband was self-employed in a landscaping business, StalkerFrederickson, and earning approximately Seven Hundred Dollars
($700.00) gross income per month.

(See Finding 7 of Findings

of

Fact,

Order

for

Conclusions

of

Law

and

in

Re:

Petition

Modification)
8.
entry of

For the three full tax years immediately prior to the
the Decree of Divorce, the husband had earned the

following total gross incomes:

Forty-Eight Thousand Two Hundred

Thirty-Eight Dollars ($48,238.00) in 1982, Sixty Thousand Seven
Hundred Fifty-Seven Dollars ($60,757.00) in 1983, and Fifty-Six
Thousand Eight Hundred Six Dollars ($56,806.00) in 1984. For the

A

three full tax years immediately prior to the Decree of Divorce,
the husband's gross annual income averaged Fifty-Five Thousand
Two Hundred Sixty-Seven Dollars ($55,267-00), or an average gross
monthly

income

($4,605.00).

of

Four

Thousand

(See Finding 8 of Findings

Law and Order in Re: Petition
9.

Six

for

Hundred
of Fact,

Five

Dollars

Conclusions

of

Modification)

For approximately ten years prior to December 31, 1984,

the husband was employed by Western Garden Center as a Vice
President and General Manager.

It was this employment which

generated his income for the years 1982, 1983 and 1984.

The

husband had not worked as an accountant for approximately eleven
years prior to the entry of the Decree of Divorce.
9 of Findings
Petition
10.

for

of

Fact,

Conclusions

of

(See Finding

Law and Order

in

Re:

Modification)

The husband had obtained a Bachelor of Science degree

in accounting from the University of Utah in 1972.

As of the

time of the Decree of Divorce, the wife had received a Bachelor's
degree and a Teaching Certification, but she needed to retrain
and re-certify in order to obtain employment as a school teacher.
(See Finding 10 of Findings
in Re: Petition
11.

for

of Fact,

Conclusions

of Law and Order

Modification)

Subsequent to the entry of the Decree of Divorce, the

wife has re-certified as a special education teacher.

As of

October 4, 1989, the date of trial on the husband's petition for
modification, the wife was employed by a school district within
the State of Utah at a gross annual salary of Nineteen Thousand

Dollars ($19,000.00).

To earn this salary, the wife is employed

from approximately September through May, inclusive, and has the
summer months free from employment.

of

Fact,

Conclusions

of

Findings

(See Finding 11 of

Law and Order

in

Re:

Petition

for

Modification)
12.

As of October 4, 1989, the wife had pursued additional

graduate level education at the University of Utah during the
summers and plaintiff anticipates that she will obtain a Master's
degree in education in the summer of 1990 or in December of 1990.

(See Finding 12 of Findings
in Re: Petition
13.

for

of Fact,

Conclusions

of Law and Order

Modification)

The accounting industry has changed significantly and

substantially since the husband obtained his Bachelor's degree in
accounting

in

1972,

in

that

the

"computer

occurred in the accounting field since 1972.

revolution"

has

The husband is not

capable of obtaining significant and substantial employment in
the

accounting

industry

without

retraining

"computer literacy" in his accounting field.

Findings
for

of Fact,

Conclusions

and

obtaining

(See Finding 13 of

of Law and Order in Re:

Petition

Modification)
14.

husband

Since the entry of the Decree of Divorce herein, the
remained

employ€*d

with

approximately December of 1985.

Stalker-Frederickson

through

Thereafter, in January of 1986,

he began to work to open a business known as "The Garden Centre,"
which business

he anticipated would be competitive with his

former employer, Western Garden Center.

The husband operated The

Garden

Centre

from

early

1986

through

August

27, 1987.

Thereafter, The Garden Centre closed due to financial losses. As
a result of the closure of The Garden Centre, the husband is
currently

indebted

to

his

partner,

Steven

Evans,

in

the

approximate sum of Thirty-Eight Thousand Dollars ($38,000.00),
together with accruing interest, and to First Security Bank, in
the

sum

of

approximately

Nine Thousand

Dollars

($9,000.00),

together with accruing interest.

(See Finding 14 of Findings

of

Fact,

Order

for

Conclusions

of

Law and

in

Re:

Petition

Modification)
15.

The husband purchased a home in the summer of 1985,

using a Ten Thousand Dollar ($10,000.00) down payment to do so.
His monthly payment for this property is Three Hundred Ninety
Dollars ($390.00).

The husband occupies this property with his

present wife, Debbie Amundsen.

Fact,

Conclusions

of

(See Finding 15 of Findings

Law and

Order

in

Re:

Petition

of

for

Modification)
16.

In an effort to satisfy his obligations to his partner

the husband has assigned to Steven Evans his lien interest in the
former marital residence of the parties to this action, having an
approximate value of Thirty Thousand Dollars ($30,000.00) and has
further given his former partner, Steven Evans, a Second Deed of
Trust and Trust Deed Note upon his current residence, upon which
the

husband

payment.

made

the

Ten Thousand

Dollar

($10,000.00) down

The equity value in the husband's current residence and

his equity interest in the marital residence of the parties to
7

this action, total, is less than the sum owing by the husband to
(See Finding 16 of Findings

Steven Evans.

of Law and Order in Re: Petition
17.

for

of Fact,

Conclusions

Modification)

During the winter season of 1986/1987, the husband went

to school and obtained a real estate license in the State of
Utah.

After the termination of his self-employment with The

Garden Centre in August of 1987, the husband attempted to sell
real estate.

He continued in his efforts to sell real estate

from January 1987 through the end of 1987 and, during this period
of time, obtained a single real estate commission, which he was
required to share with his business partner, Steven Evans.
Finding 17 of Findings
Re: Petition
18.

for

of Fact,

Conclusions

(See

of Law and Order

in

Modification)

Commencing

in August of

1987, the husband

sought

employment, including employment in the accounting industry, in
the

landscaping

management.

and

nursery

industry

and

in

general

retail

During the Fall of 1987, he obtained an offer of

employment

at

Seven

Dollars

employment

at

a Fred Meyer

($7.00) per
store

hour

for

full-time

in Salt Lake City, Utah,

obtained an offer to work in an entry-level accounting position
for a credit card company for approximately Thirteen Thousand
Five Hundred Dollars ($13,500.00) per year, and obtained an offer
from a nursery and landscaping concern in Boston, Massachusetts,
known as M. Huberman, Inc.

The offer from M. Huberman, Inc. was

for Four Hundred Seventy-Five Dollars ($475.00) per week, gross
income, and the use of an apartment on site at the nursery and

store.

The husband accepted employment with M. Huberman, Inc.

and voluntarily terminated that employment on or about June 1,
1988 and returned to Salt Lake City.

The husband terminated his

employment at M. Huberman, Inc. because Boston was "a foreign
environment" to him and he became very depressed and very unhappy
while living in Boston.
Conclusions
19.

(See Finding 18 of Findings

of Law and Order in Re: Petition

for

of

Fact,

Modification)

The husband continued his job search in Salt Lake City

during the summer of 1988 and obtained employment at Ernst Home
and Garden Center as a sales manager in August of 1988, where he
has remained employed through the date of trial on his petition
for modification, on October 4, 1989.

As of that date, the

husband's income at Ernst Home and Garden Center was Eighteen
Thousand Two Hundred Dollars ($18,200.00) per year, for a gross
monthly

income of One Thousand Five Hundred

($1,516.00).

(See Finding 19 of Findings

Law and Order in Re: Petition
20.

for

of Fact,

Sixteen Dollars
Conclusions

of

Modification)

The husband is scheduled to work 40 hours per week each

week at Ernst Home and Garden Center, but actually works between
45 and 48 hours per week due to his duties as sales manager.

His

work schedule varies on a weekly basis and he may be assigned by
his store manager to work any eight-hour shift or split-shift
commencing at any time from 6:00 a.m. and concluding at any time
up until 10:00 p.m., seven days per week.
of

his

weekly

preceding week.

work

schedule

on

The husband is advised

Friday

(See Finding 20 of Findings

of

the

immediately

of Fact,

Conclusions

of Law and Order in Re: Petition
21.

for

Modification)

The husband herein remarried in September of 1988 and

currently resides with his wife, Debbie Amundsen.

They have no

children as issue of his new marriage and none are expected.
husband's present wife is employed.

of

Fact,

Conclusions

of

Findings

(See Finding 23 of

Law and Order

in

Re:

The

Petition

for

Modification)
22.

The husband filed a petition to modify the Decree of

Divorce herein to reduce his child support obligation to his
former wife on or about November 9, 1988.

In response, the wife

filed a motion seeking a judgment for child support arrearages
(See Finding 24 of Findings

and alimony arrearages.

Conclusions

of Law and Order in Re: Petition

23.

for

of

Fact,

Modification)

As of the date of trial herein, the husband was in

arrears in his child support obligation to his former wife in the
sum of Eight Thousand Three Hundred Dollars ($8,300.00) and was
in arrears in his alimony obligation in the sum of Two Thousand
Dollars

($2,000.00).

For purposes of this calculation, the

arrearages in child support wer calculated at the rate set forth
in the Decree of Divorce.

of

Fact,

Conclusions

of

Findings

(See Conclusions 8 and 9 of

Law and Order

in

Re:

Petition

for

Modification)
24.

The husband borrowed Nine Thousand Dollars ($9,000.00)

from his father to pay child support between the date of entry of
the

Decree

of

modification.

Divorce

and

the

trial

(See Finding 28 of Findings

on

his

of Fact,

petition

for

Conclusions

of Law and Order in Re: Petition
25.
had

for

Modification)

Up to the date of trial, on October 4, 1989, the wife

reasonably

incurred

court

costs

and

attorney's

fees of

approximately One Thousand Two Hundred Dollars ($1,200.00) and
the husband had reasonably incurred court costs and attorney's
fees

of

approximately

Two

(See Finding 26 of Findings

($2,200.00).

Law and Order in Re: Petition
26.

Thousand

for

Two
of Fact,

Conclusions

of

Modification)

came

on

for trial before the lower court, the

Honorable Pat B. Brian, Judge presiding.

Pursuant to its ruling

of that date, the Court entered its Findings
of Law and Order
(a true

Conclusions

Dollars

On October 4, 1989 the parties' respective petitions

and motions

1989,

Hundred

in Re: Petition
and

correct

of Law and Order

for

copy

of Fact,

Modification

on November 7,

of which Findings

in Re: Petition

for

Conclusions

of

Modification

Fact,
is

attached hereto, designated as "Exhibit C" of the Addendum hereto
and

incorporated

herein by

reference) denying

the

husband's

petition to modify the Decree of Divorce and awarding the wife a
judgment

for

attorney's

fees,

child

support

arrearages

and

alimony arrearages.
27.

From that judgment and order of the court, the husband

has filed a timely appeal.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The lower court erred in failing to grant the husband's
petition to modify the Decree of Divorce to reduce his child
support obligation to his former wife for reason that his income

was substantially and significantly lower at the time of the
entry of the Decree of Divorce than the income relied upon by the
Court in setting his child support obligation to begin with.
Further, the lower court erred in basing its judgment upon
the finding that the husband could obtain additional education to
enhance his employment skills (and, therefore, his income) over
and above the income he enjoyed at the time of trial.
Further, the trial court erred in basing its judgment upon a
finding that the husband could and should obtain employment in
excess of 40 hours per week, since such a finding was in direct
violation of Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-45-7.5(2), which
provides that income, for purposes of determination of child
support "is limited to the equivalent of one full-time job."
Given the financial circumstances of the parties, the lower
court erred in awarding the wife a judgment against the husband
for attorney's fees and for child support arrearages calculated
at the older, higer rate set forth in the Decree.
ARGUMENT
POINT 12
A.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT THE
HUSBAND'S PETITION TO MODIFY CHILD SUPPORT.
The
husband
established
that a
substantial change in circumstances had
occurred.

It is well settled that, in the State of Utah, a party
petitioning a court to modify a decree of divorce must establish
that a substantial change in circumstances has occurred since the
entry of the decree of divorce warranting reconsideration of

issues.
In

the

instant

case,

the

husband

established

that

the

following circumstances existed at the time of the entry of the
Decree of Divorce:
(a)

At the time of the Decree of Divorce, the wife was

not employed outside the home and had not been employed outside
the

home

and

earning

an

independent

income

for

approximately

eight (8) years;
(b)

For the three (3) full tax years immediately prior

to the entry of the Decree of Divorce the husband's gross annual
income

averaged

Fifty-Five

Thousand

Two

Hundred

Sixty-Seven

Dollars ($55,267.00), for an average gross monthly income of Four
Thousand Six Hundred Five Dollars ($4,605.00);
(c)

For ten (10) years prior to December 31, 1984, the

husband had been employed

by Western Garden Center as a vice-

president and general manager;
(d)

Pursuant to the Decree of Divorce, the husband was

awarded a lien upon the marital residence in the sum of Thirty
Thousand Dollars ($30,000.00).
By the time of trial on the husband's petition to reduce his
child support obligation, the following circumstances existed:
(a)

The wife had recertified as a special education

teacher and was employed by a school district in the State of
Utah

at

a

gross

($19,000.00).
approximately

annual

salary

of

Nineteen

Thousand

Dollars

To earn this salary, the wife was employed from
September

through May and had the summer
13

months

free from employment;
(b)
December

From the entry of the Decree through approximately

of

1985,

the

husband

Frederickson, a landscaping concern.

was

employed

by

Stalker-

Thereafter, in January of

1986, he began to work to open a business known as "The Garden
Centre," which operated through August 27, 1987 and eventually
closed due to financial losses.

As a result of the closure of

The Garden Center, the husband is indebted to his former partner
in the sum of Thirty-Eight Thousand Dollars ($38,000.00) and to
First

Security

($9,000.00).

Bank

in

the

sum

of

Nine

Thousand

Dollars

The lien he was awarded on the marital residence

has been pledged to satisfy the obligation to his former business
partner;
(c)

In August of 1988, the husband accepted employment

at Ernst Home and Garden Center as a sales manager, where he
remained employed through the date of trial on his petition for
modification.

As of that date, the husband's gross annual income

was Eighteen Thousand Two Hundred Dollars ($18,200.00), or One
Thousand Five Hundred Sixteen Dollars ($1,516.00) per month.
Hence, it can be seen that the wife's income has increased
from nothing at the time of the entry of the Decree of Divorce to
Nineteen Thousand Dollars ($19,000.00) per year at the time of
the modification trial, working only nine months out of the year.
Conversely, the husband's income has decreased from approximately
Fifty-Five Thousand Two Hundred Sixty-Seven Dollars ($55,267.00)
per year relied upon by the Court at the time of the

^cree of

Divorce, to Eighteen Thousand Two Hundred Dollars ($18,200.00)
annually, working twelve months per year, at the time of trial on
the modification.
Thousand Dollar

Moreover, the husband has lost his Thirty-

($30,000.00) asset, which was his lien on the

marital residence of the parties to this action.
It might be argued that the husband's income at the actual
date of entry of the Decree of Divorce was approximately Seven
Hundred

Dollars

($700.00)

per

month

from

his

landscaping

business, Stalker-Frederickson, and that his income has actually
doubled from the date of entry of the Decree of Divorce to the
monthly income which he now enjoys of One Thousand Five Hundred
Sixteen Dollars ($1,516.00) per month.

However, this would be a

nonsensical interpretation of the facts in existence at the time
of the Decree of Divorce and the order contained within the
Decree of Divorce itself.

The Decree of Divorce ordered the

husband to pay child support to the wife for the first six months
after the entry of the Decree of Divorce in the sum of Two
Hundred Fifty Dollars ($250.00) per month, per child, for three
minor

children,

and

thereafter

increasing

to

Three

Hundred

Dollars ($300.00) per month, per child, for three minor children,
and

again

increasing,

after a period of

an additional

nine

months, to Three Hundred Fifty Dollars ($350.00) per month, per
child, for three minor children.

If it is assumed that the trial

court in the initial decree based the award of child support upon
the

husband's

actually

existing

income

(rather

than

his

historical income at Western Garden Center), then it ib assumed

that the trial court originally ordered the husband to pay child
support in excess of his gross monthly income, and then ordered
him to

increase this child

thereafter.

support obligation

in

increments

This is a highly illogical interpretation of the

Decree of Divorce and the facts in existence at the time of the
Decree.
A better interpretation of the Decree of Divorce is that the
trial court relied upon the husband's historical earnings which
averaged

Fifty-Five

Thousand

Two Hundred

Sixty-Seven

Dollars

($55,267.00) per year for the three years immediately preceding
the year in which the Decree of Divorce was entered, or an
average gross monthly income of Four Thousand Six Hundred Five
($4,605.00).
original

It is this presumed income level which supports the

imposition

of

a

child

support

obligation

of

Seven

Hundred Fifty Dollars ($750.00) per month, increasing over time
to

One

Thousand

Fifty

Dollars

($1,050.00)

per

month.

Interestingly enough, if the husband's historical gross monthly
income of Four Thousand Six Hundred Five Dollars ($4,605.00) and
the wife's lack of income at the time of the Decree of Divorce
are

factored

into

the

currently

existing

child

support

guidelines, we arrive at a base level of child support identical
to the support imposed by the Decree.

(See hypothetical Child

Support

hereto,

Obligation

Worksheet

attached

designated

as

"Exhibit D" of the Addendum hereto and incorporated herein by
reference.)

Certainly, the trial court assumed that the husband

could match his historical earning ability, which was i n excess

of Four Thousand Dollars ($4,000.00) per month, in imposing the
child

support

obligation

which

it

did.

It

has

now

been

established that the husband cannot match this earning ability
and, in fact, his monthly income is less than one-third the
income

relied

upon by

the trial

court in fixing the child

support.
The increase in the wife's income and the extreme reduction
in the husband's income since the entry of the Decree constitute
substantial changes in circumstances with regard to the issue of
child support, and the Court should have found such a substantial
change in circumstances to exist.
B.

Once

The lower court should have applied the
legislative child support guidelines to
establish the husband's child support
obligation.

the

evidence

was

presented

to

the

trial

court,

compelling a finding that a substantial change in circumstances
had occurred

regarding child

support, the Court

should have

applied the Utah uniform child support guidelines to assess the
husband's child support obligation to his former wife.

Had the

trial court done so, child support would have been set in the
amount of Two Hundred Eighty-Three Dollars ($283.00) per month
for both children, or One Hundred Forty-Two Dollars per child, as
established by the child support obligation worksheet, a copy of
which is attached as "Exhibit E" of the Addendum hereto.
The uniform child support guidelines are presumptive in the
State of Utah.

(Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-45-7.2, a true
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and correct copy of which is attached hereto, designated as
"Exhibit E" of the Addendum hereto, and incorporated herein by
reference.)
the

The lower court enunciated no basis to depart from

guidelines

in

establishing

the

husband's

child

support

obligations as required by Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-457.2(3), and the support guidelines should be been followed.
C.

The trial court erred in assessing the
husband's child support based upon a
requirement that he obtain additional
education.

Evidence adduced at trial on the husband's petition for
modification established the following facts:
(a)

That

the husband

had obtained

a Bachelor of

Science degree in accounting from the University of Utah in 1972;
(b)
and

The accounting industry has changed significantly

substantially

since

the

husband

obtained

his

degree

in

accounting in that the "computer revolution" has occurred in the
accounting

field

since

1972.

The

husband was

found

to be

incapable of obtaining significant and substantial employment in
the

accounting

industry

without

"computer literacy" in that field;
of

Fact,

Conclusions

of

Law and

retraining

and

obtaining

(See Finding 13 of
Order

in

Re:

Findings

Petition

for

Modification)
(c)

The husband did not work in the accounting field

at the time of the divorce and did not work in the accounting
field between the time of the divorce and the time of trial on
his petition;

(See Findings 7, 9, 14, 18 and 19 of Findings
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of

Fact,

Conclusions

of

Law

and

Order

in

Re:

Petition

for

Modification)
(d)

Commencing in August of 1987, the husband sought

employment in the accounting industry.

He obtained an offer of

employment for an entry-level accounting position for a credit
card

company

at

Thirteen

($13/500.00) per year.

Thousand

Five

Hundred

This was the best offer he received in

the accounting field during his job search.
Findings
for

of Fact,

Dollars

Conclusions

(See Finding 18 of

of Law and Order

in Re:

Petition

Modification)
The trial court ordered that the husband go back to school

to retrain and to obtain "computer literacy" so that he could
obtain employment in the accounting field.

In essence, the lower

court ordered the husband to retrain for a completely different
field of employment than he held at the time of the entry of the
decree of divorce or at any time subsequent thereto.
court concluded:
professional
computer

industry."

"Defendant should be required to enhance his

skills

skills

The trial

so

that

he

can

become

and can obtain employment

(See Conclusion 2 of Findings

Law and Order in Re: Petition

for

proficient

in the

of Fact,

with

accounting

Conclusions

of

Modification)

The trial court should be prohibited from assessing a child
support obligation based upon its estimation of what the husband
might

be able to do if he were to retrain in a different field

which might

command a higher income.

By way of analogy, the

trial court could as easily have required the wiio to go to

medical school to obtain a medical degree and determine that her
income might

then

be

($80,000.00) per year

in

excess

so that

of

Eighty

she might

Thousand

Dollars

be better able to

contribute to the support of the parties' children.
The Court should be compelled to assess child support based
solely on the husband's job skills and employment situation, and
not upon mere speculation of what circumstances could potentially
exist in the future if the parties were to retrain and/or enter a
new job field.

It was an abuse of discretion for the lower court

to order the husband to retrain.
Further,

it

should

be

noted

that

the

trial

court

had

absolutely no evidence before it at the time of trial in this
action that, if the husband were to retrain in the field of
accounting, his income would then exceed the Eighteen Thousand
Two Hundred Dollars ($18,200.00) he is earning per year as a
sales manager at Ernst Home and Garden Center.

Further, the

trial court had not basis for its finding that the husband could
retrain at a relatively

low cost.

There was absolutely no

factual basis whatsoever for the court's order compelling the
husband to re-enter the university and re-train and the husband
should be relieved of this obligation.
D.

The trial court erred in assessing the
husband's child support obligation based
on more than one full-time job.

Evidence adduced at trial indicated that the husband was
employed at Ernst Home and Garden Center and scheduled to work 40
hours per week.

However, the Court also found that because of
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his job duties as sales manager, the husband actually worked 45
to 48 hours per week at Ernst.

The Court further found that the

husband's work schedule at Ernst varies on a weekly basis and
that he may be assigned by his store manager to work any eight
(8) hour shift or split shift, commencing at any time from 6:00
a.m. and concluding at any time up until 10:00 p.m. any of seven
days per week.

Further, the trial court found that the husband

is

his

advised

of

weekly

work

immediately preceding week.

schedule

on

Friday

of

the

(In other words, the husband has two

days advance notice of his work schedule for any given week.)
(See Finding 20 of Findings
in Re: Petition

for

of Fact,

Conclusions

of Law and

Order

Modification)

Despite this work schedule, the trial court ordered that the
husband should obtain additional part-time employment in order to
meet his child support burden imposed by the lower court.
decision was in error for two reasons:

This

First, pursuant to Utah

Code Annotated, Section 78-45-7.5 (1953, as amended), the trial
court was specifically prohibited from assessing child support
upon any basis other than one full-time job.

Secondly, the trial

court's admonition that the husband obtain additional part-time
employment is absurd, given the husband's already existing work
schedule.
position

The husband has been placed by the trial court in the
of

employment

being

under

required

to

circumstances

obtain
in which

additional,
he cannot

part-time
tell

any

potential part-time employer of his work schedule from week-toweek.

(In the alternative, of course, he could jeopardize his
21

full-time employment at Ernst by adhering to a work schedule for
a new part-time job, despite whatever schedule his store manager
may give him for his full-time job at Ernst.)
The husband's

child

support obligation should have been

assessed solely and exclusively upon the basis of his one fulltime job at Ernst Home and Garden Center,
POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS CALCULATION OF
THE HUSBAND'S CHILD SUPPORT ARREARAGESThe wife presented

a counter-motion

to the trial court

seeking child support arrearages and alimony arrearages against
the husband.

The trial court found that the husband's alimony

arrearages were in the sum of Two Thousand Dollars ($2,000.00)
and the husband does not dispute this assessment.
Additionally, the trial court assessed the husband's child
support arrearages to be in the sum of Eight Thousand Three
Hundred

Dollars

($8,300.00).

The husband

does dispute this

calculation.
The husband

filed his petition to modify the Decree of

Divorce, seeking a reduction in his child support, in November of
1988.

Due to delay in the court's calendar and various delays in

scheduling,

including

those

caused

by

the

wife

and/or

her

attorney in requesting continuances of trial settings, the matter
was not heard until October 1989, almost one year later.
As noted above, the trial court should have reduced the
husband's child support obligation to his former wife.

Once the

validity of the reduction in child support is established, then

the question becomes the date at which the child support should
be deemed reduced.

Trial courts in the State of Utah have the

power to reduce child support retroactively upon a petition for
modification in the interests of equity.
Section

30-3-10.6(2),

attached

hereto,

a

true

designated

and
as

(Utah Code Annotated,

correct

"Exhibit

copy

of which is

of

the Addendum

G"

hereto, and incorporated herein by reference).

In the instant

case, given the extreme changes in circumstances as between the
parties, and the dire financial circumstances of the husband,
coupled with the delay in bringing the matter to trial, the Court
should have reduced the child support retroactively to the month
of November 1988.
Once the child support was reduced retroactive to November
1988, the husband's child support arrearages should have been
assessed at the new, lower rate of support, from November 1988
through the date of the trial on October 4, 1989.
POINT III: THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING
WIFE'S REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES.

THE

Though the husband was in arrears in his child support and
alimony obligations to the wife at the time of trial in October
of

1989,

it

is

not

difficult

to

see,

from

the

financial

circumstances of the parties, why this had occurred.

In fact,

the husband had borrowed Nine Thousand Dollars ($9,000.00) from
his father over the years in an effort to meet his child support
and alimony obligations to his former spouse.

Clearly, the

husband was not in contempt of the court for failure to pay child
23

support

and

alimony

as

previously

ordered

because

of

his

inability to meet the requirements of the court order.
Further, at the time of trial, the husband had presented to
the court a valid petition for modification of the Decree of
Divorce, which petition should have been granted by the Court•
Further,

at

the

tim€* of

trial, the wife's

income was

actually higher than the husband's income, and, additionally, the
wife worked only nine months per year to earn this income while
the husband worked twelve months per year to earn his lower
income.
Given the financial circumstances of the parties, the trial
court erred in assessing attorney's fees against the husband and
should have required that each party pay his or her own court
costs and attorney's fees.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should find that the
trial court erred in refusing to grant the husband's petition for
modification.

The matter should be remanded to the trial court

for entry of a finding that a substantial change in circumstances
has

occurred

warranting

reconsideration

of

child

support.

Further, the matter should be remanded for entry of an order of
child support payable by the husband to the wife at the rate
required by the Utah legislative child support guidelines.

These

guidelines should be calculated upon the basis of the husband's
income of Eighteen Thousand Two Hundred Dollars ($18,200.00) per
year,

which

is

One

Thousand

Five
24

Hundred

Sixteen

Dollars

($1,516.00) per month, and upon the basis of the wife's income of
Nineteen Thousand Dollars

($19,000.00) per year, which is One

Thousand Five Hundred Eighty-Three Dollars ($1,583.00) per month,
for the two remaining minor children.

The husband should be

relieved of the requirements of the lower court that he seek
additional training and/or part-time employment.

Further, the

matter should be remanded for assessment of appropriate child
support arrearages, and assessment of appropriate attorney's fees
under the circumstances.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS

X ^

day of March, 1990.

CORPORON & WILLIAMS
f

IY C.' CORPdftON
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that
Corporon

&

Williams,

I am employed

attorneys

for

the

in the offices of
defendant/appellant

herein, and that I caused the foregoing Brief of Appellant to be
served upon plaintiff by placing four true and correct copies of
the same in an envelope addressed to:
CHERYL FREDERICKSON
Plaintiff/Respondent Pro Se
1562 South 1500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
and depositing the same in the United States mail, with first
class postage prepaid affixed thereon, at Salt Lake City, on the
day of March, 1990•
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78-45-7.4

JUDICIAL CODE

78-45-7.4. Obligation — Adjusted gross income used.
Adjusted gross income shall be used in calculating each parent's share
the child support award. Only income of the natural or adoptive parents oft!
child may be used to determine the award under these guidelines.
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.4, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 214, § 6.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, Chapter 214

became effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

78-45-7.5. Determination of gross income — Imputed ir
come.
(1) As used in the guidelines "gross income" includes:
(a) prospective income from any source, including nonearned source!
except under Subsection (3); and
(b) income from salaries, wages, commissions, royalties, bonuses, renti
gifts from anyone, prizes, dividends, severance pay, pensions, interes'
trust income, alimony from previous marriages, annuities, capital gain*
social security benefits, workers' compensation benefits, unemploymen
compensation, disability insurance benefits, and payments fror
"nonmeans-tested" government programs.
(2) Income from earned income sources is limited to the equivalent of on
full-time job.
(3) Specifically excluded from gross income are:
(a) Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC);
(b) benefits received under a housing subsidy program, the Job Train
ing Partnership Act, S.S.I., Medicaid, Food Stamps, or General Assis
tance; and
(c) other similar means-tested welfare benefits received by a parent
(4) (a) Gross income from self-employment or operation of a business shal
be calculated by subtracting necessary expenses required for self-employ
ment or business operation from gross receipts. The income and expense*
from self-employment or operation of a business shall be reviewed t<
determine an appropriate level of gross income available to the parent tc
satisfy a child support award. Only those expenses necessary to allow the
business to operate at a reasonable level may be deducted from gross
receipts.
(b) Gross income determined under this subsection may differ from the
amount of business income determined for tax purposes.
(5) (a) When possible, gross income should first be computed on an annual
basis and then recalculated to determine the average gross monthly income.
(b) Each parent shall provide suitable documentation of current earnings, including year-to-date pay stubs or employer statements. Each parent shall supplement documentation of current earnings with copies of
tax returns from at least the most recent year to provide verification of
earnings over time and shall document income from nonearned sources
according to the source.
(c) Historical and current earnings shall be used to determine whether
an underemployment or overemployment situation exists.
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78-45-7.6

(6) Gross income includes income imputed to the parent under Subsection
(7).
(7) (a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent stipulates
to the amount imputed or a hearing is held and a finding made that the
parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed.
(b) Income shall be imputed to a parent based upon employment potential and probable earnings as derived from work history, occupation qualifications, and prevailing earnings for persons of similar backgrounds in
the community.
(c) If a parent has no recent work history, income shall be imputed at
least at the federal minimum wage for a forty-hour work week. To impute
a greater income, the judge in a judicial proceeding or the presiding officer in an administrative proceeding shall enter specific findings of fact as
to the evidentiary basis for the imputation.
(d) Income may not be imputed if any of the following conditions exist:
(i) the reasonable costs of child care for the parents' minor children
approach or equal the amount of income the custodial parent can
earn;
(ii) a parent is physically or mentally disabled to the extent he
cannot earn minimum wage;
(iii) a parent is engaged in career or occupational training to establish basic job skills; or
(iv) unusual emotional or physical needs of a child require the
custodial parent's presence in the home.
(8) (a) Gross income may not include the earnings of a child who is the
subject of a child support award, nor benefits to a child in the child's own
right, such as Supplemental Security Income.
(b) Social Security benefits received by a child due to the earnings of a
parent may be credited as child support to the parent upon whose earning
record it is based, by crediting the amount against the potential obligation of that parent. Other unearned income of a child may be considered
as income to a parent depending upon the circumstances of each case.
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.5, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 214, § 7.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, Chapter 214

became effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

78-45-7.6. Adjusted gross income.
(1) As used in the guidelines, "adjusted gross income" is the amount calculated by subtracting from gross income alimony previously ordered and paid
and child support previously ordered.
(2) The guidelines do not reduce the total child support award by adjusting
the gross incomes of the parents for alimony ordered in the pending proceeding. In establishing alimony, the court shall consider that in determining the
child support, the guidelines do not provide a deduction from gross income for
alimony.
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.6, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 214, § 8.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, Chapter 214

became effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.
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GUSTTN, ADAMS, KASTING & LIAPIS
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Third Floor, New York Building
48 Post Office Place
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
•OOOOO-

fiM&OO A/0, *.<iSi

CHERYL FREDERICKSON,
Plaintiff,

DECREE OF DIVORCE

v.
KEITH FREDERICKSON,
Defendant.

C i v i l No. D - 8 5 - 1 0 4 0
J u d g e David B. Dee
•ooOoo-

This matter having come on regularly for hearing on the ^ fc>
day of September, 1985, before the Honorable David B. Dee, one of
the Judges of the above-entitled Court, Plaintiff appearing in
person and by and through her attorney, Paul K. Liapis, and
Defendant not appearing in person or by and through his attorney,
but having executed a written Stipulation of Property Settlement
Agreement wherein he consented to the entry of his default,
consented that his pleadings should be withdrawn and that the
matter could be heard in his absence and without further notice,
and the written agreement of the parties having been submitted
and approved by the Court and Plaintiff having been sworn and
examined on the basis of the Complaint and the Court having

reviewed the records and files herein, and the Court having
inquired into the legal sufficiency of the evidence so adduced
and being fully advised in the premises, and the Court having
made and entered herein its written Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, and upon motion of Paul H. Liapis of Gustin,
Adams, Kasting & Liapis, attorneys for Plaintiff:
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
DECREED as follows:
1.

The Plaintiff, CHERYL FREDERTCKSON, be and she is

hereby awarded a Decree of Divorce from the Defendant, KEITH
FREDERICKSON, upon the grounds of mental cruelty, and the
marriage between Plaintiff and Defendant be and the same is
hereby dissolved, and the parties are hereby free and absolutely
released from the bonds of matrimony and all the obligations
thereof with said Decree to become final upon signing and entry
of the Decree of Divorce herein.
2.

The home of the parties located at 1562 South 1500

East, Salt Lake City, Utah and more particularly described as
LOTS"60, 61 & 62, BLK 3, EMERSON HEIGHTS ADD. ALSO BEG ON THE S BDY LINE OF
LOT 59, BLK 3, SD ADD & 20 FT E OF THE SW COR OF SD LOTS; N 1 FT; E 30 FT;
S 1 FT; W 30 FT TO BEG 3981-497
be and the same is hereby awarded to Plaintiff, subject to
Plaintiff's assumption of the first mortgage thereon and subject
to a lien in favor of Defendant in the sum of $30,000,00, payable
when Plaintiff remarries, cohabits with an adult person of the
opposite sex, when Plaintiff sells or fails to use said home as
her primary residence, or at the time the youngest child has
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attained the age of 18 years and graduated from high school
during the child's normal and expected year of graduation.
3.

Plaintiff be and is hereby awarded the permanent care,

custody and control of the minor children of the parties, namely,
Rachel A., age 15, born on April 22, 1970; Adam D., age 11, born
on February 16, 1974; and Megan L., age 7, born on November 7,
1977, subject to reasonable visitation rights on behalf of the
Defendant, which visitation shall include:
a.

Every other weekend from Friday at 6:00 p.m. to

Sunday at 6:00 p.m.;
b.

From noon on December 26th until school starts;

c.

Other times as arranged between the parties with

proper notice;
d.

Two weeks in the summer to coincide with the

Defendant's vacation; and
e.
4.

Alternating Thanksgiving holidays.

Defendant be and he is hereby ordered to pay to

Plaintiff, as an alimony settlement, the sum of $9,500.00, with
said amount payable at $5,500.00 from the present amount held by
the parties in a time certificate with First Interstate Eank and
the remaining $4,000.00 to be paid in sums of $2,000.00 on the
1st day of April, 1987, and $2,000.00 on the 1st day of April,
1989.
5.

Defendant be and is hereby ordered to pay to Plaintiff

the sum of $250.00 per child per month as child support for a
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period of six months, at which time said child support shall
increase to the sum of $300.00 per child per month for a period
of nine months, at which time said child support shall then
increase to the sum of the $350.00 per child per month, with all
sums payable in two equal sums on the 1st and 15th days of each
month, commencing with the 1st day of September, 1985, and
continuing until each child has attained the age of 18 years and
has graduated from high school during each child's normal and
expected year of graduation.
6.

Defendant be and is hereby awarded as his sole and

separate property the 1977 Toyota station wagon; his interest in
Stalker-Frederickson Landscaping; his bank accounts; the
downstairs sleeper couch; two plaid chairs; an oak wardrobe; a
kitchen cupboard and all contents; one color T.V.; the Atari 800
computer; the microwave oven; the cart to the microwave oven; two
occasional tables (Barbara's); one desk; one file cabinet; one
lamp; two bed frames; some glasses; one freezer; clay pots and
baskets; two wicker chairs; one wicker end table; one funny
little table; one chest of drawers; one refrigerator; one stove;
a portion of the family photos; his year books; two metal garbage
cans; Larry's paintings; the pool table; the sailboat; the area
rug; and his personal effects and belongings.
7.

Plaintiff

be and is hereby awarded as her sole and

separate property the 1979 Volkswagen Rabbit; her bank accounts;
the piano; the Sweetwater time share; all of the remaining items
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of furniture, furnishings, fixtures and appliances in the home,
with the exception of those items awarded to the Defendant above;
and her personal effects and belongings.
8.

Plaintiff be and is hereby ordered to assume and hold

Defendant harmless therefrom the following obligations:

The

first mortgage payment on the home and any debts she has incurred
in her own name since the filing of the Complaint in this matter.
9.

Defendant be and is hereby ordered to assume and

hold Plaintiff harmless therefrom the following obligations: Any
remaining debts and obligations incurred by the parties during
the course of the marriage not paid for from the proceeds from
the sale of the Defendant's interest in Western Gardens; any
debts associated with the Defendant's new business,
Stalker-Frederickson Landscaping, including all tax obligations
incurred therefrom; and any debts incurred by him since the
separation of the parties.
10.

Plaintiff be and she is hereby awarded, as her sole and

separate property, the sum of $5,500.00 as her share of the
Defendant's Western Garden retirement account.
11.

Defendant be and is hereby ordered to pay from his

share of his retirement account with Western Gardens the sum of
$5,500.00, to carry forth the alimony award set forth above, with
said amounts to be paid forthwith.
12.

The Defendant's dividend, received from Western Garden,

of $10,870.14 has been divided between the parties with $2,900.00
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left in a time certificate at First Interstate Bank to be used to
cover the tax obligations incurred by the parties for receipt of
the dividend sums and retirement account by the Defendant,

The

balance of said sums have been divided equally between the
parties, which the Court hereby ratifies.

The parties are

ordered to file a separate tax return for the year 1985, each
declaring their respective portions of this dividend check and
retirement funds as income, and each party using their one-half
of the $2,900.00 to cover the tax liability on their respective
returns.

If any amounts are not needed to cover taxes by either

party, then the remaining balance shall be awarded to the
Plaintiff as her sole and separate property.

If there is a

shortfall of money to cover the taxes of either party, then that
party shall be responsible for his or her share of the taxes
owing.
13.

The Court ratifies the division made by the parties of

the Western Garden buyout of $40,088.00, with $6,339.39 being
paid on the parties1 mutual obligations and the balance of
$33,748.61 being divided equally between the parties.
14.

Defendant be and is hereby ordered to maintain,

unencumbered, all of the presently existing life insurance
policies presently in force on his life in the sum of $150,000.00
and to name the children of the parties as the primary, sole and
exclusive beneficiaries thereon until each has attained 21 years
of age.
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15.

Defendant be and is hereby ordered to maintain an

adequate policy of health, accident, hospitalization and dental
insurance for the benefit of the minor children of the parties
until each has attained 21 years of age.

Should the Plaintiff

have available, through her employment, similar insurance, she
shall maintain said policy as a secondary carrier for the benefit
of the children.

Any amounts that are not covered by either

insurance carrier, deductibles, or noncovered items, shall be
shared equally between the parties.
16.

Defendant shall forthwith transfer ownership of the

life insurance policy on Plaintiff's life, to the Plaintiff, and
Plaintiff shall maintain that life insurance policy for the
benefit of the children until they attain the age of 21 years,
marry or become self-supporting.
17.

The parties be and they are each hereby ordered to

assume and pay their own attorney's fees and costs incurred
herein.
18.

The parties be and they are each hereby ordered to do

and perform all the matters and things required by each of them
to be done herein, and the Settlement Agreement of the parties is
approved and confirmed in all particulars.
DATED this j7 £> day of September, 1985.
BY THE COURT:

DfcVltTB. DEE

DISTRICT JUDGE ,-v-.
7
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MARY C. CORPORON #734
Attorney for Defendant
CORPORON & WILLIAMS
Suite 1100 - Boston Building
#9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 328-1162
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH.
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW and ORDER IN RE: PETITION
FOR MODIFICATION

CHERYL FREDERICKSON,
Plaintiff,

rQco/^3?

-vs-

Civil No. 854901040DA

KEITH FREDERICKSON,

Judge Pat B. Brian

a\5QL0o\

Defendant.

THE
Divorce

DEFENDANT'S
and

Petition

plaintiff's

for Modification

various

hearing before the above-en tr.it led

motions

of

having

Decree of

come

on

for

court, tho Honorable Pat B.

Brian, Judge presiding, on October 4, 1989, plaintiff appearing
pro se and in person, and defendant appearing in person and being
represented

by

proceeded

to

received

the

counsel, Mary

hear

the

exhibits

C. Corporon, the

testimony
of

the

of

parties

Court

the parties
and

having

and

having
having

heard

the

arguments of parties and/or counsel and having reviewed the file
and the pleadings contained therein, based thereon and good cause
appearing therefor, the Court now makes and enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The parties to this action were previously husband and

wife, having been divorced by an ord^r entered in this Court on

or about September 26, 1985.
2.

Plaintiff

children, namely:

and

defendant

are

Rachel, born April

the parents

of three

22, 1970; Adam, born

February 16, 1974; and, Megan, born November 7, 1977.

Plaintiff

was awarded the permanent care, custody and control of the minor
children of the parties, subject to defendant's reasonable rights
of visitation, as defined in the Decree of Divorce.
3.

The

oldest

child

of

the parties

has achieved her

majority, leaving two of the children as minors.
4.

Defendant was ordered to pay to plaintiff the sum of Two

Hundred Fifty Dollars ($250.00) per month, per child, as and for
support of the children for a period of six months after the
Decree of Divorce, at which time the support was to increase to
the sum of Three Hundred Dollars ($300.00) per month, per child,
for a period of nine months, at which time the child support was
to increase to the sum of Three Hundred Fifty Dollars ($350.00)
per month, per child, until the children attained the age of 18
years and graduated from high school in the normal expected years
of their graduations.
5.

Pursuant to the Decree oE Divorce previously entered

herein, each of the parties was awarded a one-half interest in
their marital residence.

Plaintiff was permitted to occupy the

residence and had an interest in the residence of approximately
Thirty Thousand Dollars ($30,000.00).

Defendant was granted a

lien for Thirty Thousand Dollars ($30,000.00).
6.

At the time of the entry of the Decree of Divorce

herein, plaintiff was not employed outside the home and had not
been

employed

outside

the

home

and
2

earning

an

income

for

approximately

eight

years

iuunediately p r i o r

to

the Decree of

Divorce.
7.

At the time of the entry of the Decree of Divorce,

defendant was self-employed in a landscaping business, StalkerFrederickson, and earning approximately Seven Hundred Dollars
($700.00) per month, gross income.
8.
of

the

For the three tax years immediately prior to the entry
Decree

of

Divorce

herein, defendant

following total gross incomes:
and $56,806 in 1984.

had

earned the

$48,238 in 1982, $60,757 in 1983

For the three full tax years immediately

prior to the Decree of Divorce, defendant's gross annual income
averaged

ixfty-Five

Thousand

Two Hundred

Sixty-Seven

Dollars

($55,267.00), or an average gross monthly income of Four Thousand
Six Hundred Five Dollars ($4,605.00).
9.
defendant

For approximately ten years prior to Dei ember 31, 1984,
was

employed

by Western Garden Center

as a vice-

president and general manager.

It was this employment which

generated

years

his

income

for

the

1982,

1983

and

1984.

Defendant had not worked as an accountant for approximately 11
years prior to the entry of the Decree of Divorce.
10.

At the time of the entry of the Decree of Divorce

heroin, defendant had obtained a Bachelor of Science degree in
accounting from the Universii.y of Utah in 1972.

As of the time

of the Decree of Divorce, plaintiff: hud received a Bachelor's
degree and a teaching certification, but plaintiff needed to retrain and re-certify in order to obtain employment as a school
teacher.
1] .

Subsequent

to the entry of the Pecrr*

of Divorce

herein,

plaintiff

teacher.

has

re-certified

as

a

special

education

As of October 4, 1989, plaintiff was employed by a

school district within the State of Utah at a gross annual salary
of Nineteen Thousand Dollars ($19,000.00) por year.
salary,

plaintiff

is

employed

from

To earn this

approximately

September

through May, inclusive, and plaintiff has the summer months free
from employment.
12.

As of October 4, 1989, plaintiff had pursued additional

graduate level education at the University of Utah during the
summers,

and

plaintiff

anticipates

that

she

will

obtain

a

Master's degree in education in the summer of 1990 or in December
of 1990.
13.

The accounting industry has changed significantly and

substantially since the defendant obtained his Bachelor's degree
in accounting in 1972, in that the "computer revolution" has
occurred in the accounting field since 1972.

Defendant is not

capable of obtaining significant and substantial employment in
the

accounting

industry

without

retraining

and

obtaining

"computer literacy" in his accounting field.
14.
defendant

Since the entry of the Decree of Divorce herein,
remained

employed

with StaJker-Frederickson

approximately December of 1985.

through

Thereafter, in January of 1986,

defendant began work to open a business known as "The Garden
Centre," which business he anticipated would be competitive with
his former employer, Western Garden Center.
The Garden

Centre

from early

Defendant operated

1986 through August

27, 1987.

Thereafter, The Garden Centre closed due to financial losses. As
a

result of the closure of The Garden Centro, defendant is

currently indebted to his partner in The Garden Centre, Steven
Evans, in the approximate sum of Thirty-Eight Thousand Dollars
($38,000.00),

together

with

accruing

interest, and

to First

Security Bank in the sum of approximately Nine Thousand Dollars
($9,000.00), together with accruing interest.
15.

Defendant purchased a home in the summer of 1985, using

a Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) down payment to do so.

The

defendant's monthly payment for this property is Three Hundred
Ninety Dollars ($390.00).

Defendant occupies this property with

his wife, Debbie Amundsen.
16.

In an effort to satisfy defendant's obligations to his

partner, Steven Evans, defendant has assigned to Steven Evans his
lien interest in the marital residence of the parties to this
action

in

the

approximate

value

of

Thirty

Thousand

Dollars

($30,000.00) and has further given his former partner, Steven
Evans, a Second Deed of Trust and Trust Deed Note upon his
current

residence.

The equity value

in defendant's

current

residence and his equity interest in the muiital residence of the
parties to this action, total, is less than the sum owing by
defendant to Steven Evans.
17.

During the winter season of 1986/1987, defendant went

to school and obtained a roal estate license in the State of
Utah.

After the termination of his self-emp]oyment with The

Garden Centre in August of 1987, defendant attempted to sell real
estate.

Defendant continued in his efforts to soil real estate

from January 1987 through the end of 1987 and during this period
of time obtained a single real estate commission which he was
required to share with his business partner, Steven Evans.
5

18.

Commencing

in

August

of

1987, defendant

sought

employment, including employment in the accounting industry, in
the

landscaping

management.

and

nursery

industry

and

in general

retail

During the fall of 1987, defendant obtained an offer

of employment at seven dollars ($7.00) per hour for full-time
employment

at

a Fred

Meyer

store

in Salt Lake City, Utah,

obtained an offer to work in an entry-level accounting position
for a credit card company for approximately Thirteen Thousand
Five Hundred Dollars ($13,500.00) per year, and obtained an offer
from a nursery and landscaping concern in Boston, Massachusetts,
known as M. Huberman, Inc.

The offer from M. Huberman, Inc. was

for Four Hundred Seventy-Five Dollars ($475.00) per week, gross
income, and the use of an apartmont on site at the nursery and
store.

Defendant accepted employment with M. Huberman, Inc. and

voluntarily terminated the employment on or about June 1, 1988,
and returned to Salt Lake City.

Defendant testified that he

terminated his employment at M. Ilnberman, Inc. because Boston was
a "foreign environment" to him and he became very depressed and
very unhappy while living in Boston.
19.

Defendant continued his job search in Salt Lake City,

Utah during the sum of 1988 and obtained employment at Ernst Home
and Garden Center as a sales manager in August of 1988, where he
remained employed through the date of trial of this matter, on
October 4, 1989.

As of October 4, 1989, defendant's income at

Ernst Home and Garden Center was Eighteen Thousand Two Hundred
Dollars ($18,200.00) per year, for a gross monthly income of One
Thousand Five Hundred Sixteen Dollars ($1,516.00) per month.
20.

Defendant is scheduled to work '10 hours per week, each
6

week, at Ernst Home and Garden Center, but defendant actually
works between 45 and 48 hours per week, due to his duties as
sales manager.

Defendant's work schedule varies on a weekly

basis and defendant may be assigned by his store manager to work
any eight-hour shift or split-shift commencing at any time from
6:00 a.m. and concluding at any time up until 10:00 p.m. seven
days per week.

Defendant is advised of his weekly work schedule

on Friday of the immediately preceding week.
21.
obtaining
support

The Court

finds that the defendant

additipnal

part-time

burden

imposed

employment

by the Decree of

is capable of

to meet

the child

Divorce

herein and

defendant should be required by this Court to seek additional
part-time

employment

in

order

to

meet

that

child

support

obligation.
22.
enhance

The
his

defendant

employment

can

obtain

skills,

additional

including,

education to

specifically,

his

computer ski.lLs, at relatively low cost to the defendant.
23.

Plaintiff has not remarried since the entry of the

Decree of Divorce herein.
1988

and

currently

Defendant remarried in September of

resides

with

his wife, Debbie Amundsen.

Defendant has no children as issue of his new marriage and none
are expected.
24.

Defendant'3 wife is employed.

Defendant filed a petition to modify the Decree of

Divorce herein to reduce his child support obligation to the
plaintiff on or about November 9, 1988.
motion

seeking

a

judgment

for child

Plaintiff has filed a
support

arrearages

and

defendant

was

alimony arrearages.
2ri.

As

of

the

date

of

trial
7

heroin,

substantially in arrears in his child support obligation to the
plaintiff.
26.
p]aintiif

Up to the date of trial herein on October 4, 1989,
had

incurred

court

costs

and

attorney's

fees

of

approximately One Thousand Two Hundred Dollars ($1,200.00)f which
were reasonable attorney's fees for plaintiff to have incurred
under the circumstances.
defendant

had

incurred

Up to the date of trial herein, the
court

costs

and

attorney's

fees

of

approximately Two Thousand Two Hundred Dollars ($2,200.00), which
were reasonable court costs and attorney's feos Tor defendant to
have incurred under the circumstances.
27.

The two remaining minor children of the parties are in

their most expensive years.
28.

Defendant borrowed Nine Thousand Dollars ($9,000.00)

from his father to pay child support since the entry of the
Decree of Divorce.
BASED UPON THE FOREGOING and good cause appearing therefor,
the Court now makes and enters the following:
CONCLUS TONS _OP_ LAW
1.

Child support should not be assessed against defendant

based upon a single window in time.
2.

Defendant should be required to enhance his professional

skills so that he can become proficient with computer skills and
can obtain employment in the accounting industry.
3.

Defendant should be required by this Court to go back to

school to enhance his computer skills,
4.

Defendant should be required by this Court to move to

another local ion to increase his income, if ne<~e. sary.
8

5.

The Court

is concerned that defendant has obligated

himself to the purchase of another home and that he did so before
the Decree of Divorce was final in this matter.
6.

The Court finds that there is a change in circumstances

as between the parties, but that this chanvge in circumstances is
not a substantial change such as would warrant reduction of the
defendant's child support obligation to the plaintiff.
7.

Defendant's motion and petition for a reduction in his

child support obligation to the plaintiff should be denied.
8.

Plaintiff should be awarded a judgment for all child

support arrearages incurred through and including September 30,
1989, in the full amount ordered by the Decree of Divorce.

The

parties should cooperate in establishing the amount of the child
support arrearages to be reduced^ to judgment by this Court.

In

the event that the parties are unable to agree upon an amount for
the

child

support

arrearages,

then

this

issue

should

be

reviewable by the Court upon motion of either party.
9.
defendant

Plaintiff

should be granted a judgment against the

for alimony arrearages

in the sum of Two Thousand

Dollars ($2,000.00).
10.

Defendant's

child

support

obligation

should

be

temporarily set at Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($250.00) per month,
per child, for a period of one year, com.nc-nc Lng October 1, 1989,
but with defendant to make up the deficiency between Two Hundred
Fifty Dollars ($250.00) per month and the amount of child support
set forth in the Decree of Divorce, at a later date, to be
determined by the Court.

The defendant's child support should be

payable one-haIf on the first day of each month and one—half on
9

the 15th day of each month.
11.

Defendant should be required to apply the funds freed

by the temporary reduction in child support to the enhancement of
his

employment

skills

and

he

should

keep

records

of

books

purchased and tuition paid so that his activities in this regard
may be reviewed by the Court.
12.

The

Court

should

not

find

the defendant

tu be

in

contempt of court at this time.
13.
Hundred

Defendant
Dollars

should

be

ordered

($500.00) representing

to

pay

plaintiff

Five

a portion of her court

costs and attorney's fees incurred herein, said legal fees to be
payable by defendant to plaintiff at the rate of Fifty Dollars
($50,00) per month, commencing February 1, 1990 and on the first
day of each month thereafter until paid in fuJ1.
14.

This

matter

should

be

reviewed

by

the

Court

automatically on October 11, 1990 at the hour of 8:30 a.m., the
Honorable Pat B. Brian, Judge presiding.

The parties should not

be sent any further notice of the hearing and those findings and
the

order

of

the

Court

should

be

the only

parties will receive of this hearing.

notice

which

the

Further, the parties have

been advised of this hearing in open court on October 4, 1989.
BASED UPON THE FOREGOING Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, and good cause appearing therefor;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.
2.
all

Defendant's Petition for Modification herein is denied.
Plaintiff is granted a judgment against defendant for

child

support

arrearages

accrued

through

and

including

September 30, 1989, at the full amount set forth in the Decree of
in

divorce.

The parties are ordered to cooperate in calculating

this child support arrearage and shall submit an additional order
to this Court setting forth the amount of the arrearages.

In the

event the parties are unable to agree on the amount of these
arrearages, then this issue may be brought before the above court
for review upon motion of either party.
3.
alimony

Plaintiff is granted a judgment against defendant for
arrearages

in

the

sum

of

Two

Thousand

Dollars

($2,000.00).
4.

Defendant's child support obligation to the plaintiff is

temporarily set at Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($250.00) per month
per child, for a period of one year, commencing October 1989,
said child support to be payable by defendant to plaintiff onehalf on the first and one-half on the 15th day of each month;
however, this child reduction shall ho made up by the defendant
and paid to the plaintiff at a later time, to be determined by
the Court.
5.

Defendant is ordered to enhance his employment skills.

Defendant shall keep records of all books purchased, tuition paid
and all educational endeavors pursued to enhance his employment
skills and shall report with these records to this Court at the
review hearing established by thi^ Order.
6.

Defendant is not found to be in contempt of court at

this time.
7.

Defendant is ordered to pay to plaintiff the sum of Five

Hundred Dollars ($500.00), representing a portion of plaintiff's
court costs and attorney's fees incurred herein, payable at the
rate of Fifty Dollars ($50.00) per month, commencing February 1,
11

1990 and on the first day of each month thereafter until paid in
full.
8.

This matter shall automatically

come on for review

before this Court, the Honorable Pat B. Brian, Judge presiding,
on October 11, 1990, at the hour of 8:30 a.m.

This Order is the

only notice the parties shall receive of this review hearing.
DATED THIS rs^

day of

/[//j l/j?s&zt ^ A ^

1989.

BY THE COURT ^

PAT B. BRIAN
District Court Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY

CERTIFY

that

I am employed

in the offices of

Corporon & Williams, attorneys for the defendant herein, and that
I caused the foregoing proposed Order to be served upon plaintiff
by placing a true and correct copy of the same in an envelope
addressed to:
CHERYL FREDERICKSON
Plaintiff Pro Se
1562 Squth 1500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah

84106

and depositing the same, sealed, with first-class postage prepaid thereon, in the United States mail at Salt Lake City, Utah
on the

--day of October, 1989.

V , MA A V? _±i
Secretary
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MARY C. CORPORON #734
Attorney for Defendant
CORPORON & WILLIAMS
Suite 1100 - Boston Building
#9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 328-1162

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH,
CHERYL FREDERICKSON,
Plaintiff,

-HYPOTHETICAt>
CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION
WORKSHEET (Sole Custody)

-vs-

Case No. 8S4901040DA

KEITH FREDERICKSON,

Judge Pat B. Brian

Defendant,

BASE AWARD CALCULATION;
Mother

Father

Number of Children
Gross Monthly Income

$

0

$4,605

Previously Ordered & Paid Alimony

$

0

$

0

Previously Ordered Child Support

$

0

$

0

Present Family Obligation

$

n/a

$

n/a

Adjusted Gross Monthly Income

$

0

$4,605

Base Combined Child Support Obligation

Combined
3

$ 4,605
$ 1,050

Proportionate Share

0%

100%

Share of Base Child Support

$

0

$1,050

Children's Portion of Medical and
Dental Insurance Premiums

$

0

$

0

BASE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD

$1,050

Base Amount Per Child
(will be reduced by 50% during
"extended visitation" — at least
25 of any 30 consecutive days)

$

350

\ suufctf t

MARY C. CORPORON #734
Attorney for Defendant
CORPORON & WILLIAMS
Suite 1100 - Boston Building
#9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 328-1162

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH.
CHERYL FREDERICKSON,
Plaintiff,

CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION
WORKSHEET (Sole Custody)

-vs-

Case No. 854901040DA

KEITH FREDERICKSON,

Judge Pat B. Brian

Defendant.

BASE AWARD CALCULATION;
Mother

Father

Gross Monthly Income

$1,583

$1,516

Previously Ordered & Paid Alimony

$

0

$

0

Previously Ordered Child Support

$

0

$

0

Present Family Obligation

$

n/a

$

n/a

Adjusted Gross Monthly Income

$1,583

Number of Children

$1,516

Base Combined Child Support Obligation
Proportionate Share
Share of Base Child Support

$ 3,099
$

49%

51%
$

283

Children's Portion of Medical and
Dental Insurance Premiums

$

0

BASE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD

$

283

$

142

Base Amount Per Child
(will be reduced by 50% during
"extended visitation" — at least
25 of any 30 consecutive days)

Combined
2

294
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JUDICIAL CODE

78-45-7.2

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Amount of award.
Factors considered.
—Wealth of party's parents.
Findings of fact.
Cited.
Amount of award
Award of $300 per month per child constituted an abuse of discretion, where the wife's
monthlv gross income was $1,033 and the husband's was $8,333; award was therefore increased to $600 per month per child. Martinez
v. Martinez, 754 P.2d 69 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
.,
,
Factors considered.
—Wealth of party's parents.
The plaintiff argued the wealth of the defendant's parents, who made large gifts of money
to the defendant during the marriage, should
have been considered by the trial court. Such a
consideration would have been tantamount to
imputing the wealth and income of her parents
to the defendant, and thereby imposing a duty
of child support on the grandparents. Such a
result would have been contrary to the con-

cepts of parental duty and common sense.
Ebbert v. Ebbert, 744 P.2d 1019 (Utah Ct. App.
1987).
Findings of fact.
The trial court's failure to make explicit
findings regarding the statutory factors pertin e n t in a child
support determination requires
remand to the trial court. Stevens v. Stevens,
7 5 4 R 2 d 9 5 2 ( L t a h Ct A
- PP- 1 9 8 8 ) T h i s sectl
™ requires the trial court to conSlder a t least the seven
factors listed therein,
Further, those factors constitute material issues upon which the trial court must enter
findings of fact. Jefferies v. Jefferies, 752 P.2d
909 ( U t a h Ct

App

1988)

Where the court orders a party to pay child
support to a child who has reached the age of
majority but is nevertheless entitled to support
under § 78-45-2, the court must enter specific
findings of fact on each of the factors set forth
in this section. Jefferies v. Jefferies, 752 P.2d
909 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
Cited in Kelly v. Draney, 754 P.2d 92 (Utah
Ct. App. 1988).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Note, New Standards
for Child Support Enforcement in Utah, 1986
Utah L. Rev. 591.

78-45-7.2. Application of guidelines — Rebuttal.
(1) (a) The guidelines apply to any judicial or administrative order establishing or modifying an award of child support entered on or after July 1,
1989.
(b) Neither the enactment of the guidelines or any consequent impact
of the guidelines on existing child support orders constitute a substantial
or material change of circumstances as a ground for modification of a
court order existing prior to July 1, 1989. However, if the the court finds a
material change of circumstances independent of the guidelines, the
guidelines may be applied to modifv a court order existing prior to July 1,
1989.
(2) (a) The child support guidelines shall be applied as a rebuttable presumption in establishing or modifying the amount of temporary or permanent child support.
fb) The rebuttable presumption means the provisions and considerations required by the guidelines and the award amounts resulting from
the application of the guidelines are presumed to be correct, unless rebutted under the provisions of this section.
(3) A written finding or specific finding on the record supporting the conclusion that complying with a provision of the guidelines or ordering an award
142
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78-45-7.3

amount resulting from use of the guidelines would be unjust, inappropriate, or
not in the best interest of a child in a particular case is sufficient to rebut the
presumption in that case.
(4) (a) A noncustodial parent's obligation to provide child support for natural born or adopted children of a second family arising subsequent to
entry of an existing child support order may not be considered to lower
the child support awarded to the first family in the existing order.
(b) If the custodial parent of the first family petitions to increase child
support, all natural born and adopted children of the noncustodial parent
may be considered in determining whether to increase the award.
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.2, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 214f § 4.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, Chapter 214

became effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

78-45-7,3. Procedure — Documentation — Stipulation.
(1) In a default or uncontested proceeding, the moving party shall submit:
(a) a completed child support worksheet;
(b) the financial verification required by Subsection 78-45-7.5(5); and
(c) an affidavit indicating that the amount of child support requested is
consistent with the guidelines, or that the amount is not consistent with
the guidelines.
(2) (a) If the documentation of income required under Subsection (1) is not
available, a verified representation of the defaulting party's income by
the moving party, based on the best evidence available, may be submitted.
(b) The evidence shall be in affidavit form and may only be offered
after a copy has been provided to the defaulting party in accordance with
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(3) (a) If a stipulation is submitted as a basis for establishing or modifying
child support, each parent shall present financial verification required by
Subsection 78-45-7.5(4) and an affidavit fully disclosing the financial status of each parent, as required for use of the guidelines. A hearing is not
required, but the guidelines shall be used to review the adequacy of a
child support order negotiated by the parents.
(b) A stipulated amount for child support or combined child support
and alimony is adequate under the guidelines if the stipulated child support amount or combined amount exceeds the total child support award
required by the guidelines. When the stipulated amount exceeds the
guidelines, it may be awarded without a finding under Section 78-45-7.2.
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.3, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 214, § 5.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, Chapter 214

became effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.
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30-3-10

HUSBAND AND WIFE

marital asset subject to valuation and distribution in the appropriate circumstances,
Sorensen v. Sorensen, 102 Utah Adv. Rep. 14
(Ct. App. 1989).
Trial court's valuation of the goodwill of husband's dental practice, relying on the testimony of a dentist who had been involved in
brokering the purchase and sale of dental practice8, was not an abuse of discretion. Sorensen
y. Sorensen, 102 Utah Adv. Rep. 14 (Ct. App.
J5 . ,
.
Trial court properly considered accounts receivable in its valuation of husband s dental

amount of accounts payable was harmless
error where the record was ambiguous on that
point. Sorensen v. Sorensen, 102 Utah Adv.
Rep. 14 (Ct. App. 1989).
Stipulations and agreements of parties,
Where the parties' stipulation regarding the
custody of children was incorporated into their
d vorce decree, the stipulation was an "operat i v e p a r t » o f t h e decree, subject to the continuing jurisdiction of the court, and could be modi„
fied
M
M
1 0 1 U t a h A(Jv ^
J

J

r

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Separation agreements: enforceability of provision affecting property rights

upon death of one party prior to final judgment
of divorce, 67 A.L.R.4th 237.

30-3-10. Custody of children in case of separation or divorce — Custody consideration.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Child custody: separating children
by custody awards to different parents —
post-1975 cases, 67 A.L.R.4th 354.

30-3-10.6. Payment under child support order — Judgment.
(1) Each payment or installment of child or spousal support under any child
support order, as defined by Subsection 62A-11-40K3), is, on and after the
date it is due:
(a) a judgment with the same attributes and effect of any judgment of a
district court, except as provided in Subsection (2);
(b) entitled, as a judgment, to full faith and credit in this and in any
other jurisdiction; and
(c) not subject to retroactive modification by this or any other jurisdiction, except as provided in Subsection (2).
(2) A child or spousal support payment under a child support order may be
modified with respect to any period during which a petition for modification is
pending, but only from the date notice of that petition was given to the obligee, if the obligor is the petitioner, or to the obligor, if the obligee is the
petitioner.
(3) For purposes of this section, "jurisdiction" means a state or political
subdivision, a territory or possession of the United States, the District of
Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
(4) The judgment provided for in Subsection (l)(a), to be effective and enforceable as a lien against the real property interest of any third party relying
on the public record, shall be docketed in the district court in accordance with
Sections 78-22-1 and 62A-11-311.
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SPOUSE ABUSE ACT
History: C. 1953, 30-3-10.6, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 117, § 1; 1988, ch. 1, § 3; 1988, ch.
203, § 1; 1989, ch. 62, § 1; ch. 115, § 1.
Amendment Notes. —- The 1989 amendment by Chapter 62, effective April 24, 1989,
substituted "62A-11-311" for "62A-11-309" at
the end of Subsection (4).
The 1989 amendment by Chapter 115, effec-

30-6-1

tive April 24, 1989, deleted "reduced to an administrative or judicial judgment for a specific
amount and" before "docketed" in Subsection
(4).
This section is set out as reconciled by the
0fflce o f Legislative Research and General
Counsel

CHAPTER 4
SEPARATE MAINTENANCE
30-4-1. Action by spouse — Grounds,
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R* — Insanity as defense to divorce or
separation suit—post-1950 cases, 67 A.L.R.4th
277.

CHAPTER 6
SPOUSE ABUSE ACT
Section
30-6-1.
30-6-2.
30-6-4.
30-6-5.

Definitions.
Abuse or danger of abuse — Complaint and protective orders authorized.
Assistance by court clerk and county
attorney
—
Affidavits
of
impecuniosity.
Hearing upon verified complaint —
Protective orders — Ex parte protective orders — Procedures.

Section
30-6-6.

Ex parte protective orders and protective orders — Contents —
Rights and interests not affected
— Change of address of protected
party — Notice to court of provisions of order,

30-6-1. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Abuse" means the occurrence of any of the following acts between
cohabitants:
(a) attempting to cause, or intentionally or knowingly causing,
physical harm; or
(b) intentionally placing another in fear of imminent physical
harm.
(2) (a) "Cohabitant" means a person who is 16 years of age or older and
who:
(i) is presently or was formerly a spouse;
(ii) is presently or was formerly living as a spouse;
(iii) is related by blood or marriage;
(iv) has one or more children in common with the other party
to the action, regardless of whether they have been married or
have lived together at any time; or
87

